Recent changes in liquidity by Daniel H. Brill
Recent Changes in Liquidity
by DANIEL H. BRILL
OVER THE PAST 2 years, the private sec-
tors of the economy have added substantially
to their holdings of liquid assets. The in-
crease in their stock of money, savings ac-
counts, and short-term U.S. Government
securities is notable not only because of its
size—some $60 billion or 15 per cent in 2
years—but also because it exceeded the rise
in economic activity over
the period. In previous
postwar cyclical upswings,
growth in liquid asset hold-
ings has generally lagged
growth in activity, with a
consequent decline in the
ratio of liquid assets to
gross national product. In
1962, the ratio rose and is
now back to the levels
reached at the cyclical
trough in early 1961 (Chart
1, on the facing page).
The extent of the rise in
liquidity in a period of recovery and ex-
pansion has occasioned some concern. Fears
have been expressed as to the potential in-
flationary stimulus it may provide, as to its
effect on the quality of credit if savings in-
stitutions are forced to seek out more mar-
ginal borrowers, and as to the effect on the
U.S. balance of payments of an excess sup-
ply of liquid funds seeking more profitable
investment outside the United States.
This paper does not attempt directly to
allay or confirm these fears of the con-
sequences of a rise in liquidity during eco-
nomic expansion. It will, however, attempt
to describe the process that generated the
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increase in liquid assets, to examine the
financial forms in which it occurred and the
economic groups to which it accrued, and
the effects of the increase on balance sheet
structures. This factual base may aid in ar-
riving at an assessment as to whether the
liquidity rise has been inevitable, excessive,
or, on the other hand, inadequate.
Because spending, sav-
ing, and liquidity patterns
differ markedly among sec-
tors, not much purpose
would be served in analyz-
ing aggregates that com-
bine consumers and busi-
nesses. In such aggregates,
the amounts that consumers
spend and the amounts that
they save tend to over-
whelm the amounts of
spending and saving in
other sectors, and changes
in the aggregates tend to be
a diluted version of consumer activity, blur-
ring rather than illuminating significant dif-
ferences in economic behavior patterns.
Not that simple disaggregation such as
between consumers taken as a group and
businesses taken as a group is adequate for
identifying all key behavior differences. One
should expect to find—and does in fact find
—differences among consumers with differ-
ent incomes and of different ages, and
among businesses of different industries and
of different sizes.
Unfortunately, available data do not per-
mit a consistent framework of analysis at the
desired level of disaggregation. The best one
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Chart 1
LIQUID ASSET HOLDINGS rose somewhat faster






NOTE.—For notes to this and the following charts, see page
765.
can do is to start at the level where consistent
formulations are possible—the consumer
sector, the business sector—and point out
what appear to be significant differences
within each sector to the extent the data
permit. The flow patterns of the key lending
sector, the commercial banking system, will
also be examined.
For the most part, the definitions and data
used are those of the Federal Reserve's flow
of funds accounting system. These accounts,
however, do not in themselves provide any
definition of "liquid" assets, or of "liquidity."
Rather than founder in the definitional bog
associated with these terms, in this paper the
term "liquid" assets generally refers to:
money, savings accounts and shares, and
short-term U.S. Government securities; and
"liquidity" will be measured in alternative
ways: as ratios of liquid asset holdings to
debt, ratios of liquid asset holdings to in-
comes, and ratios of required debt service
payments to incomes. Such arbitrary treat-
ment may not do justice to the fairly exten-
sive literature that has been developed in
which alternative criteria for classifying as-
sets and defining degrees of liquidity are
proposed, but in dealing with a continuum
like liquidity, any operational definition
must be somewhat arbitrary. Given the
availability and quality of data, attempts at
further refinement in measurement are not
likely to add substantially to understanding
and insight.
CONSUMERS
The proportion of incomes consumers spend
for nondurable goods and services has fluc-
tuated in a relatively narrow range over the
past decade. It reached a low of about 75
per cent of income in 1956 and a high of
about 78 per cent in late 1960 and early
1961. Although the ratio of current con-
sumption to disposable income declined dur-
ing the 1961 recovery—as it has in most
recoveries—it trended upward during most
of 1962. Recent levels of the ratio are close
to the average for the past decade (Chart 2).
Consumer spending for capital assets—
automobiles, other durable goods, and
homes—has been more volatile relative to
income than has spending for nondurable
goods and services. The ratio of capital
spending to income reached a postwar high
in 1955, and has not again approached
this level. Even the burst in consumer spend-
ing in 1959 did not bring the ratio of spend-
ing to income close to the 1955 peak.
The ratio dropped sharply in the 1960-61
recession, to a level as low as that at the
trough of almost all other postwar reces-
sions, but it has hardly risen since the cycli-
cal trough. At less than 20 per cent, the
recent ratio of capital spending to income
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Chart 2
CONSUMER SPENDING less for physical assets,
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is at a level more typical of postwar reces-
sions than of expansion periods.
Although consumer spending for durable
goods and homes has been low relative to
income, an exceptionally large proportion of
this spending has been financed through
borrowing. The ratio of borrowing to capital
outlays rose sharply from the 1961 reces-
sion trough through all of 1962, and by the
year-end had reached a level almost as high
as the previous peak in 1955.
With spending for current consumption
close to the average for the decade, and with
spending for durable goods and housing low
relative to income and financed largely out
of borrowed funds, consumers in the aggre-
gate have had a much larger share of income
available for acquisition of financial assets.
As a ratio of disposable income, the flow of
consumer funds into financial assets was at
a postwar peak in 1962.
In the 1961-62 upswing, consumers ac-
quired mainly liquid financial assets.
1 With
deposit rates rising and market rates on
securities relatively stable or even declining,
the flow of consumer financial saving went
almost entirely into deposit and share ac-
counts (Chart 2). In earlier periods of rising
consumer financial saving (1955-56 and
1959), the increase had been mainly in
securities for then interest rates on securi-
ties had risen substantially, while during
the same periods deposit rates had remained
relatively stable. (Chart 3)
Very little of the recent rise in consumer
liquid asset holdings was in spendable cash
1 Because there are no available measures of con-
sumer holdings of short-term U.S. Govt. securities,
the figures given on consumer liquid asset hold-
ings are limited to their holdings of money and
savings deposit and share balances.
YIELD SPREAD less favorable to
consumer investment in securities







Federal Reserve Bulletin: June 1963RECENT CHANGES IN LIQUIDITY 759
—demand deposits and currency. Money
holdings rose by $4 billion, compared with
a rise of $43 billion in savings accounts at
commercial banks, mutual savings banks,
and savings and loan associations. The in-
crease in money relative to other liquid as-
sets was smaller in this recent upswing than
during earlier periods of rising consumer
financial saving.
Even though consumers borrowed heavily
to finance purchases of capital assets in
1961-62, the rise in financial assets for the
consumer sector as a whole exceeded the rise
in debt by a wide margin (Chart 4). Con-
sumer holdings of liquid assets alone rose by
a total of $47 billion over this 2-year period
while the total of consumer short- and long-
term debts increased by $34 billion. The
level of consumer liquid asset holdings is
now higher relative to disposable income
than at any time since 1950.
While total debt, as well as total finan-
cial assets, has risen faster than disposable
income in the past 2 years, the short-term
component of debt has just about kept pace
with income (Chart 5). It is mainly mort-
gage debt that has outstripped incomes.
The burden of instalment debt, that is,
repayments of principal and interest as a
proportion of disposable income, has been
remarkably constant over the past 5 years
at about 13 per cent. Only in recent months
of 1963 has there been any indication that
this relationship may be breaking through
the 13 per cent "ceiling."
Data on the distribution of saving and
borrowing flows within the consumer sector
are fragmentary and far from current. Sur-
veys of consumer finances conducted by the
Michigan Survey Research Center indicate
no consistent pattern of change in ownership
of total liquid assets between early 1959 and
early 1962, but apparently some increased
concentration of ownership of savings ac-
counts by upper-income families over this
period.- In early 1959, families with in-
comes of $10,000 or more held 30 per cent
-A more current analysis was not possible at the
time this paper was prepared because data on changes
in liquid assets between early 1962 and early 1963
were not available.
Chart 5
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of all savings accounts reported; in early
1962, this group held 35 per cent of the
total. Not too much significance can be im-
puted to this shift, however, for there was a
corresponding upward shift in the income
distribution of the sample surveyed, that is,
a growth of 5 percentage points in the pro-
portion of families in the $10,000 and over
income class from one survey date to the
other.
Cross classifying by both income and age
of family head helps identify further the lo-
cus of the liquidity change. A comparison of
the average size of liquid asset balances held
by specific income-age groups in early 1959
and early 1962 indicates that the largest in-
creases occurred among the older families of
CKart 6
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t Sample too small for cross classification by age.
the lower- and middle-income classes (age
of family head 55 or more, incomes under
$10,000), and only small changes in the av-
erage balances of other age groups in these
income classes (Chart 6). The decline in
average liquid asset balances shown for the
top income class as a whole reflects largely a
very substantial drop in the average for older
families, more than offsetting an increase in
balances held by younger families. The
samples on which these averages are based,
however, are quite small, and the differences
are probably not statistically significant. The
sample of upper-income families in the 35-
54 year bracket shows little change in aver-
age balance from early 1959 to early 1962.
Despite the large increases in aggregate
instalment and mortgage debt, the average
indebtedness reported by lower- and middle-
income families changed little over the
1959-62 period. The largest change in aver-
age indebtedness was among upper-income
families and reflected mainly a substantial
rise in average mortgage debt.
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
In certain respects, developments in the
corporate sector resembled those in the con-
sumer sector. Nonfinancial corporations as
a group also applied a smaller share of in-
come—retained earnings and charges—to
acquisition of capital assets during the
1961-62 upswing than they had in earlier
recoveries. They also borrowed heavily rela-
tive to the volume of capital expenditures
(Chart 7).
In some respects, however, corporate flow
patterns differed from those of the consumer
sector. Although corporate borrowing was
high relative to spending, it was not high
relative to internally generated funds, nor
was corporate acquisition of financial assets
high relative to internal funds.
Federal Reserve Bulletin: June 1963RECENT CHANGES IN LIQUIDITY 761
Chart 7
CORPORATIONS, like consumers, spent less
on capital assets than in previous recoveries
Per cent of retained funds





and BORROWING also rises relative
to capital spending




Moreover, corporations used their finan-
cial surpluses mainly to add to their ac-
counts receivable—short-term credit to con-
sumers and other businesses—and added
very little if any to their holdings of liquid
assets (Chart 8). By and large, the pattern
shown for the corporate sector as a whole
holds for most major industry groups and
major size groups of business.
With liquid asset holdings relatively con-
stant and current liabilities rising, con-
ventional measures of corporate liquidity
show a substantial decline over the past
decade, with the decline extending through
most of 1962 (Chart 8, middle panel).
Even if the concept of liquid assets is
broadened to include holdings of other mar-
ketable instruments as well as cash and U.S.
Government securities, liquidity still shows
a declining trend. Only if one assumes that
all accounts receivable are completely liquid
does one find stability in alternative balance
sheet measures of corporate liquidity.
Income-account measures also show a de-
cline in corporate liquidity. Total liquid as-
set holdings relative to corporate activity
(measured here as GNP originating in the
corporate sector) is lower now than at the
CORPORATE LIABILITIES continue to rise
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beginning of the 1956-57 capital goods
boom and much lower than earlier in the
postwar period.
Corporations have responded to rising in-
terest rates principally by changing the com-
position of liquid asset holdings rather than
by increasing their total liquidity. The ratio
of money holdings to corporate activity has
declined, while holdings of interest-bearing
liquidity instruments, such as finance com-
pany paper and short-term Federal, State,
and local government securities have been
maintained or increased slightly.
BANKING SYSTEM
Commercial bank holdings of Federal Gov-
ernment securities have declined, relative to
total deposits, while holdings of private debt
have increased since the cycle trough in
early 1961. A shift out of Governments
could be regarded as a normal cyclical de-
velopment in economic expansions; in ear-
lier postwar upswings, banks reduced their
portfolio of Governments in order to in-
crease their ability to finance consumers and
businesses. But in this upswing—at least
through the end of 1962—banks have re-
duced their Government security holdings
relative to deposits while increasing their
holdings of mortgages and municipal secu-
rities, and they have not significantly raised
the proportion of consumer and business
loans in their portfolios (Chart 9).
The difference in banks' management of
their portfolios in the recent cyclical rise is
attributable in part to the moderateness of
private loan demands and in part to their
need to increase earnings to cover interest
costs on the swelling inflow of time and sav-
ings deposits. Of the $33 billion growth in
bank deposits since the end of 1960, $25
billion or three-fourths was in time and sav-
ings deposits.
Chart 9
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Unable to generate a sufficiently rapid
rise in business and consumer loans to cover
the rise in interest costs, banks turned to
mortgages and State and local government
bonds in their search for relatively high
yielding assets. Even in their Government
security portfolios, there has been somewhat
of a shift away from short- and intermedi-
ate-term obligations into longer-term, higher-
yielding bonds. Their holdings of long-term
Governments (with maturities of 5 years or
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more), of mortgages, and of State and local
obligations have in the aggregate increased
by $17 billion in the past 2 years, a period
over which time and savings deposits rose
by $25 billion. The tendency to match time
and saving account inflows with longer-term
investments was accentuated in 1962, when
banks acquired over $13 billion in long-
term investments against a $15.5 billion rise
in time and savings deposit liabilities.
This shift in portfolio composition sug-
gests that banks have in large measure re-
garded the rising inflow of time and savings
money as long-term saving. One can ques-
tion the validity of such an assumption.
Only half of the rise in the total has been
in savings accounts; half—somewhat more
than half in 1962 alone—has been in the
"other time" category. A substantial share
of this "other time" inflow has taken the
form of negotiable certificates of deposit,
held principally as liquidity instruments by
corporations and other sophisticated money
managers.
Despite recent portfolio and deposit com-
position shifts, bank liquidity positions are
still not seriously strained nor can one con-
clude that banks are now "locked in." Bank
holdings of short-term Government securi-
ties rose substantially during the 1960-61
recession and the early months of recovery.
These holdings have largely been retained
and are still high relative to deposits.
Nevertheless, an expansion in activity that
brought with it rising Federal and private
credit needs could put banks under reserve
pressures from both the conversion of more
volatile time accounts into demand deposits
and the increase in credit demands.
AN INTERPRETATION
The foregoing description of recent liquidity
developments indicates how far we are from
being able to draw firm conclusions about
the state of the economy's liquidity, let alone
the possible economic consequences. Yet, if
one assigns full faith to the reliability of the
observations cited, one can formulate an
interpretation of these developments that
fits the facts, although perhaps not to the
exclusion of alternative explanations.
This interpretation hinges on the observa-
tion of low rates of capital spending relative
to income, noted for both the consumer and
business sectors in the recent recovery and
expansion period. The 1955-57 capital
spending boom—which occurred mainly in
1955 for consumers and somewhat later for
businesses—probably represented a final
catching up with capital goods demands
deferred over the long period of the depres-
sion, war, and early postwar years.
Since the boom, investment has been
more nearly for replacement than for
growth. Even after the rise in spending from
the 1961 cyclical trough to the end of 1962,
business spending for new plant and equip-
ment (deflated for price change) had not
re-achieved the peak levels of 1957. The
satisfaction expressed over the current vol-
ume of automobile sales at an annual rate
of 7.75 million units has to be put into the
perspective of a total almost that large 8
years ago.
Undoubtedly, other factors than satiation
of exceptional demands have contributed to
the slack in capital spending in recent years.
Some observers suggest a lag in innovation,
with little to stimulate businessmen seeking
radically new and more efficient production
processes or to captivate consumers seeking
new products as desirable as were television
and automatic transmissions in their time.
Others assign more of the blame to a regres-
sive fiscal structure, with high tax rates limit-
ing private investment incentives and Gov-
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eminent expenditures inadequate to com-
pensate for the lag in private spending.
Whatever weight one assigns to the pos-
sible causes of slack investment demand,
the heavy dependence on debt financing of
capital outlays in the 1961-62 period ap-
pears to have been a necessity, if aggregate
economic activity were to be maintained,
and not a luxury with which a more Spartan
economy could have dispensed. Given low
spending propensities and given only mod-
erate fiscal stimulus from Government
spending and only limited tax reductions,
ample availability of credit was probably
a key factor in keeping private spending at
the levels achieved in the 1961-62 period
of expansion.
The expansion in credit need not have
been translated on the asset side into a rise
in what is customarily regarded as "liquid"
assets. In previous economic expansions,
which also involved large credit growth, con-
sumers added substantially to their hold-
ings of financial assets but not to the types of
assets usually classed as "liquid." One ex-
planation of the difference in cyclical per-
formance is the difference in relative inter-
est rates—the spread between market rates
and deposit rates—in the 1961-62 period.
In this recent expansion, yields on market
instruments have been much lower relative
to yields on deposits and savings accounts
than in earlier upswings.
An alternative or perhaps supplemen-
tary explanation is that the large increase
in security purchases in 1955-57 and again
in 1959 brought consumer security port-
folios, in the aggregate, close to some "de-
sired" level or proportion of assets to which
consumers would not want to add. Fluctua-
tions in security values over several postwar
cycles, both in the stock market and in bond
markets, may have shifted consumer pref-
erences toward liquid fixed-value claims
and away from market instruments of any
type. Also, changing expectations as to in-
flation prospects and the low level to which
stock yields had fallen may have made
equity securities less attractive. Probably
all of these factors contributed to the rise
in liquid saving.
In summary, then, the increase in liquid-
ity in 1961-62 would appear to result from
the fact that none of three factors—private
preferences, the economic cycle, or monetary
policy—conformed to recent postwar cy-
clical patterns. The low level of demands for
capital goods—low relative to both eco-
nomic resources and the level of incomes—
required, in the absence of other adequately
stimulative policies, a monetary policy per-
mitting expansion in credit availability in
order to facilitate existing spending plans
and to stimulate others. Under those circum-
stances, a curbing of credit availability, say,
to boost long-term U.S. interest rates closer
to those in major foreign markets, might
well have risked turning a slow economic
expansion into a full-scale recession. Econ-
omists' knowledge of the elasticities of do-
mestic demands to interest rate changes is
imperfect, but a number of recent studies
reviewed by the author suggest a significant
responsiveness for key investment areas. A
decline in spending and incomes might have
reduced the volume and proportion of finan-
cial saving, as happened in earlier postwar
declines, but it might have done so only at
the expense of intolerably large reductions
in employment and incomes.
As it happened, the policy measures
adopted permitted a substantial increase in
borrowing relative to spending with minimal
upward pressure on market interest rates,
while other actions of the monetary authori-
ties permitted banks to compete more ag-
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gressively for savings by raising deposit
rates, thereby encouraging the flow of funds
into what are generally considered more
liquid forms.
As for the potential inflationary stimulus
of such an increase in liquid assets, the data
cited do not in themselves suggest this to be
a likely outcome, even if one subscribes to
the proposition—as yet unproven empiri-
cally—that an increase in liquid asset hold-
ings contributes significantly to a subsequent
increase in spending. Nonfinancial corpora-
tions, in the aggregate, passed up the oppor-
tunity to apply their financial surplus to an
increase in liquidity. In fact, they have main-
tained historically low liquidity ratios and
have merely shifted their liquidity reserves
from cash to interest-bearing assets.
Consumers, in the aggregate, have become
more liquid, but the distributive data avail-
able, though incomplete, suggest that the in-
crease in liquid asset holdings has been more
marked in the portfolios of those—such as
elderly families—with generally low spend-
ing propensities or those whose spending is
not likely to be influenced significantly by
shifts in portfolio composition. Those con-
sumers who have been spending and borrow-
ing have not been the ones adding to their
liquid asset balances.
Finally, it should be noted that the liquid
asset increases recorded in the aggregates
for both the consumer and corporate sectors
have occurred primarily in interest-bearing
form rather than in spendable cash. The
ratio of money—demand deposits and cur-
rency—to GNP has continued to decline
throughout the upswing. The conversion of
a nonmoney liquid asset into cash—even
from time deposits to demand deposits—re-
quires in the aggregate an increase in the
reserves of the banking system. This proc-
ess is still subject to regulation by the
monetary system, albeit with some difficulty
and threat to the orderliness of financial
markets if expectations regarding inflation
should change quickly or in substantial
degree.
NOTES TO CHARTS:
Chart 1. Liquid assets are holdings by nonbank investors
of demand deposits and currency, time deposits, savings shares,
savings bonds, and U.S. Govt. securities maturing within 1
year. GNP data from Dept. of Commerce.
Chart 2. Based on flow of funds accounts. Data are sea-
sonally adjusted centered 2-quarter moving averages. Financial
assets exclude saving through life insurance and pension funds
and investment in noncorporate business.
Chart 3. The total of financial investment considered here is
the same as in Chart 2. The yield spread is the yield on
3- to 5-year U.S. Govt. securities minus commercial bank time
deposit rates.
Chart 4. Same definition of financial assets as given in note
to Chart 2. Liquid assets exclude U.S. Govt. securities because
of lack of detailed data on ownership by maturity class. For
composition of short-term debt, see note to Chart 5. "Other"
debt is mortgage debt.
Chart 5. Short-term debt covers all short-term and inter-
mediate-term consumer credit.
Chart 6. The liquid asset holdings and instalment and mort-
gage debt are averages for each group. Data from Survey of
Consumer Finances.
Chart 7. Financial assets cover total corporate financial in-
vestments with trade credit taken net of trade debt. Borrowing
consists of funds obtained in credit and equity markets.
Chart 8. The bottom panel shows corporate assets as per-
centage of income originating in the corporate sector. Other
liquid assets include time deposits, U.S. Govt. securities, and
commercial paper.
Chart 9. Portfolios and deposits at commercial banks.
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